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PRECAP; STATE V. BLAZ: DRAWING THE LINES FOR
ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CRIMES
Rachel Pannabecker
ORAL ARGUMENT is set for Monday, May 1, 2017, at 10:30 a.m. in the
Strand Union Building, Ballroom A on the campus of Montana State
University, Bozeman, Montana.
I.

QUESTION PRESENTED

Did the District Court err when it admitted evidence of a prior
domestic violence incident between Appellant and his spouse in
Appellant’s trial for the deliberate homicide of his infant daughter?1
II.

INTRODUCTION

Appellant Matthew Blaz (“Blaz”) was charged with, and
convicted by a jury of, the deliberate homicide of his 2-month-old
daughter.2 The District Court sentenced Blaz to life in prison without the
possibility for parole.3 Before trial, Blaz sought to prevent the State from
introducing evidence of a prior domestic violence incident between Blaz
and his wife pursuant to Montana Rules of Evidence (MRE) 404(b) and
403.4 Rule 404(b) limits the admissibility of evidence of prior “crimes,
wrongs, or acts,”5 and Rule 403 prohibits evidence that is more prejudicial
to the defendant than probative of the issue.6
On appeal, Blaz argues that the District Court erred when it denied
Blaz’s motion in limine to exclude this evidence.7 Blaz maintains that if
the jury had not heard the evidence of the prior domestic violence incident,
his trial would have ended differently, and thus the resulting error was not
harmless error.8 Consequently, Blaz argues that he did not receive a fair
trail.9

1

Brief of Appellant, Montana v. Blaz, 2016 WL 3043446 at *1 (Mont. May 24, 2016) (No. DA 140807).
2
Id.
3
Brief of Appellee, Montana v. Blaz, 2016 WL 6827325 at *1 (Mont. Nov. 16, 2016) (No. DA 140807).
4
Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at *13.
5
MONT. R. EVID. 404(b) (2015).
6
MONT. R. EVID. 403 (2015).
7
Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at *1.
8
Id.
9
Id.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A.

Facts of Present Case

Blaz has been married to his wife, Jen, for about five years.10 They
had three children, A.B, Kiera, and Matti.11 A.B. is Blaz’s 7-year-old son;
Kiera is Jen’s 14-year-old daughter and Blaz’s stepdaughter; and Matti
was Blaz and Jen’s daughter, who was two months old when she died on
August 16, 2013.12
On August 16, 2013, Blaz stayed home with Kiera and Matti after
he dropped Jen off at work at 8:15 a.m. 13 Matti was a healthy, happy
baby. 14 After dropping Jen off at work, Blaz watched some TV with
Matti. 15 Keira went to the neighbor’s house to bring back her friend,
Serenity, for a play-date in Keira’s room in the basement. 16 At around
10:00 a.m., Blaz went outside to talk to the mailman.17 While Blaz was
talking to the mailman, Serenity’s brother, Brooks, biked over to the
Blaz’s house to play with Serenity and Kiera down in the basement. 18
Before heading downstairs, he stopped next to Matti, who was lying on a
blanket on the floor.19 Brook testified that Matti was crying when he saw
her, so he tickled her stomach for about ten seconds before heading
downstairs to see what his sister and Kiera were doing, and he did not pick
Matti up. 20 Matti was still crying when Brooks headed downstairs. 21
Brooks found Serenity and Kiera playing with stuffed animals and left
shortly afterwards.22 While Brooks was still downstairs, Blaz opened the
door and asked the three of them if they had picked up or touched Matti.23
The girls said no, and Brooks answered that he had tickled Matti’s stomach
but did not pick her up, and Blaz yelled, “okay,” and shut the door.24 When
Brooks left the house, Matti was still lying on a blanket on the living room
floor, crying.25
Blaz’s version of the story is slightly different. Blaz testified that
he could see Brooks holding Matti through the window while he was
standing outside talking to the mailman. 26 Next, Blaz heard a loud
10

Brief of Appellee, supra note 3, at *1.
Id.
12
Brief of Appellee, supra note 3, at *1; Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at *4.
13
Brief of Appellee, supra note 3, at *1.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Brief of Appellee, supra note 3, at *4; Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at *2.
17
Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at *4.
18
Brief of Appellee, supra note 3, at *2; Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at *4.
19
Brief of Appellee, supra note 3, at *2.
20
Id..
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id. at *2–3.
24
Id. at *3.
25
Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at *3.
26
Id. at *5.
11
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scream.27 He told the mailman that he needed to get back inside, and the
mailman answered in the affirmative, exclaiming that he needed to “get
[his] ass in there.”28 The mailman denied ever making that statement to
Blaz.29 When Blaz got inside, Brooks was hovering over Matti and ran
downstairs when Blaz asked what happened.30 Blaz noticed two marks on
Matti’s neck and tried to calm her.31 Blaz yelled downstairs to inquire
about what happened to Matti and the reason for the marks he found on
her neck, and Brooks ran outside shortly afterwards.32
Later that day around noon, Blaz brought a pork sandwich to Jen
for her lunch at work.33 He gave Matti a bottle of milk and laid her down
for a nap.34 Before arriving at her office, Blaz spoke with Jen on the phone
but did not tell her anything about Matti being injured, and Jen was not
worried about Matti.35 Jen was unaware of Matti being injured until Blaz,
Kiera, and Matti arrived to pick her up from work at 4:00 p.m.36 In the car,
Blaz mentioned to Jen that Brooks dropped Matti while he was talking to
the mailman and Matti had some pinch marks on her neck.37 When they
stopped at Wal-Mart, Jen turned Matti around to take her out of her car
seat. 38 Jen immediately knew that something was wrong with Matti
because her coloring was gray, her eyes were bulging out, and her
breathing was funny.39 Alarmed, Jen insisted that they go the hospital right
away.40 Matti then took a few last breaths and stopped breathing.41 Jen told
Blaz to stop driving and dial 9-1-1.42
By the time the ambulance arrived, Matti was not breathing, her
eyelids were purple, and she had no heartbeat.43 She was unresponsive to
CPR and needed a bag mask, but her heart restarted.44 Matti was very pale
and cool to the touch and had bruising on the front of her neck, back, and
ear.45 When she arrived at the hospital, Matti’s eyes were fixed and dilated,
indicating that her brain had stopped functioning––Matti’s brain had been
“obliterated.”46 After learning from the doctors that her brain injuries were
27

Id.
Id.
29
Id. at *6–7.
30
Id. at *5.
31
Brief of Appellee, supra note 3 at *4.
32
Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at *5–6.
33
Brief of Appellee, supra note 3, at *3.
34
Id. at *16.
35
Id. at *3.
36
Id. at *4.
37
Id.
38
Id. at *5.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id. at *6.
46
Id. at *6–7.
28
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beyond medical help, Jen and Blaz chose to take Matti off of life support.47
Matti died five to ten minutes later.48
Emergency room doctor Debra Lewis and pediatrician Michael
Seaton treated Matti when she arrived at the hospital.49 Dr. Seaton and Dr.
Lewis both testified that Matti’s two skull fractures were not consistent
with simple falls.50 When babies fall off changing tables, shopping carts,
or are dropped, they usually suffer from hematomas that cause minor
bumps under the skin and sometimes a minor crack in the skull––Matti’s
injuries were “way beyond that.”51
Pathologist Dr. Walter Kemp conducted an autopsy on Matti on
August 17, 2013.52 Dr. Kemp found ten millimeters of thick, greenishblack fluid in her stomach, which is inconsistent with what partially
digested milk would look like.53 Dr. Kemp opined that Matti died because
of another person’s intentional and harmful act and that her sustaining a
strong, forceful impact against a broad surface caused her injuries.54 His
report further stated that a fall or dropping of Matti could not have caused
her injuries.55 Matti had a subgaleal hemorrhage, retinal hemorrhage, and
left skull fracture that was the result of the mendosal suture popping open
from the force of the blow on the left side of her head.56 This hemorrhaging
was of the “abuse and motor vehicle type,” and Dr. Kemp concluded that
Matti died as a result of a homicide.57
B.

Facts of Blaz’s Prior Offense

Thirty-seven days prior to Matti’s death, Blaz committed the
offense of Partner Family Member Assault (PFMA).58 When Blaz came
home drunk from a softball game one night, he wanted to hold Matti, who
was two-weeks old at the time.59 Blaz kept dozing off, so Jen took Matti
from Blaz’s arms and told him she was going to change and feed her.60
Blaz became upset that Jen took Matti away from him.61 Blaz came up
behind Jen, grabbed her hair, threw her on the ground, and started banging
her head against the floor.62 Jen was holding Matti during the assault.63
47

Id. at *7.
Id.
49
Id. at *6.
50
Id. at *7.
51
Id. at *7–8.
52
Id. at *17.
53
Id. at *18 (contradicting Blaz’s earlier testimony that he fed her a bottle of milk earlier that day).
54
Id. at *19.
55
Id..
56
Id. at *20.
57
Id. at *19–20.
58
Id. at *20.
59
Id. at *21.
60
Id. at *21–22.
61
Id. at *22.
62
Id.
63
Id.
48
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Blaz then took Matti back from Jen, who was yelling at Blaz to give Matti
back.64 Kiera and her friend were downstairs, and they yelled at Blaz to
stop hurting Jen.65 Blaz yelled, “You better shut that bitch up or I will.”66
IV.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
A.

Appellant Matthew John Blaz

1.
Evidence Regarding the PFMA was inadmissible under MRE 404(b)
because it was not admissible to show motive.
Blaz argues that the evidence regarding the PFMA should not
have been admitted by the district court. MRE 404(b) provides that
evidence of a “crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a
person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person
acted in accordance with the character.”67 However, this evidence can be
admitted for some other purpose, such as to prove “motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack
of accident.”68 Blaz argues that the State has not proposed any permissible
uses of the PFMA evidence; that it was only used to show Blaz “had a
character which was violent, aggressive, or abusive in nature;” and that
this type of character led him to kill Matti.69
Blaz argues that the PFMA was not admissible to show motive,
and he breaks this argument into two different theories. First, Blaz argues
that the evidence was not probative of a common motive from Blaz’s
feelings toward Jen and her children living in the household. 70 For the
common motive theory to be applicable, the State must be able to
demonstrate that Blaz had a motive to injure Matti through the PFMA
against Jen.71 Blaz maintains that, because the PFMA occurred when Blaz
tried to hold Matti affectionately, it does not reflect a motive to hurt Matti
later. 72 Supporting his assertion, there was no evidence that Blaz was
intending to threaten or harm Matti during the PFMA.73 The State must
also be able to show that Blaz had a reciprocal motive to get at Jen through
harming Matti. 74 The PFMA does not indicate that Blaz held hostile
feelings towards Jen, which would cause him to kill Matti to get back at

64

Id.
Id.
66
Id.
67
MONT. R EVID. 404(b).
68
Id.
69
Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at *18.
70
Id. at *20.
71
Id.
72
Id. at *24.
73
Id.
74
Id. at *20.
65
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Jen.75 Blaz argues that the single occurrence of the PFMA, as opposed to
repeated instances, is not demonstrative of a continuing pattern of violence
towards Jen that would support a desire to kill Matti as a way to get back
at Jen.76
With regards to the second motive theory, Blaz argues that the
State was incorrect in offering the PFMA offense, conviction, and no
contact order to show that Blaz had a motive and incentive to hide Matti’s
injuries in reference to the delay in taking Matti to the hospital. 77 Blaz
contends that the PFMA did not provide any insight into delaying medical
attention to Matti because it is not evidenced by consciousness of guilt of
the PFMA. 78 A person who has injured another would delay seeking
medical attention for that person to avoid punishment regardless of
whether he or she has previously committed an assault. 79 Blaz would
theoretically delay seeking medical attention for Matti because he knew of
the assault’s illegality, regardless of his prior PFMA.80 Therefore, Blaz
argues that the PFMA does not further the State’s theory that the PFMA
provided motive to delay medical attention.81
2.
The PFMA evidence was not admissible under 404(b) to show
opportunity.
Blaz also argues that the PFMA no contact order was not
admissible to show that Blaz had the opportunity to kill Matti. 82 Blaz
contends that the State’s theory does not make logical sense because it
does not successfully show that Blaz’s presence in the home in August
was relevant to Blaz’s presence in the home in July when he committed
the PFMA.83 Further, the issue of opportunity is not at issue because the
undisputed facts demonstrate that Blaz was staying at home with Matti
when Jen went to work the day of Matti’s death.84 Blaz argues that the
State cannot use a prior offense to prove a point that is not at issue in the
case.85 To the extent the State was using the no contact order to show Blaz
failed to abide to court orders, the evidence has no bearing on the
undisputed fact of opportunity.86

75

Id. at *24.
Id.
77
Id. at *26.
78
Id.
79
Id. at *27.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id. at *28.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id. at *29.
76
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3. The PFMA evidence was not admissible to show absence of mistake
or accident.
Blaz argues that the PFMA evidence was not admissible to show
that there was an absence of mistake or accident because Blaz is not
claiming that he accidentally killed Matti.87 Rather, Blaz claims that he did
not kill Matti and that Matti died because of injuries sustained when
Brooks dropped her on her head earlier that day. 88 A fundamental
prerequisite to the State admitting this evidence on the theory of mistake
or accident is that the defendant claim he made a mistake in killing the
victim.89 Therefore, this evidence is unfounded and inadmissible.90
4. The PFMA was also inadmissible under Rule 403 because it is overly
prejudicial.
Blaz argues in the alternative that, if the evidence would be
admissible under Rule 404(b), Rule 403 guards against the admission of
the PFMA because its prejudice to the defendant is outweighed by its
probative value to the issue of the case.91 Blaz contends that admitting the
evidence prompted the jury to decide the case on an improper basis—that
Blaz was a bad man because he hurt his wife and that because he is a bad
man he also killed his daughter.92 Additionally, Blaz argues that the PFMA
evidence increased the jury’s hostility towards Blaz because of what he
did to Jen, and this hostility misled and distracted them from the actual
events of August 16, 2013.93
5. The District Court’s error in admitting the evidence was not harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt
Next, Blaz argues that the admission of the PFMA evidence
contributed to the jury’s determination that Blaz was guilty of Matti’s
homicide. 94 Because the jury was influenced by Blaz’s prior assault
against his wife, they used it to support their conclusion that Blaz killed
Matti.95 Had the District Court properly denied admission of the evidence,
the jury never would have heard it and would not have been able to use it
to support their guilty verdict.96 Even though the jury was given a limiting
instruction not to use the evidence to infer bad character, Blaz contends
87

Id.
Id. at *30.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id. at *33.
92
Id. at *36.
93
Id.
94
Id. at *38.
95
Id.
96
Id.
88
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that the jury could not escape the clear implication from the nature of the
PFMA that Blaz was a violent and aggressive person who was repeating a
pattern of violence.97 Because of the reasonable probability that the jury
used the PFMA to determine his guilt, Blaz argues that he did not receive
a fair trial and that the District Court’s error in admitting the evidence was
not harmless error.98
B.

Plaintiff and Appellee State of Montana

1.
The PFMA evidence was properly admitted under Rule 404(b) to
show motive and absence of mistake or accident.
The State first argues the PFMA was properly admitted to show
that Blaz had a motive to disregard Matti’s safety, which was apparent in
his assault against Jen and the homicide of his daughter. 99 The State
contends that Blaz completely disregarded Matti’s safety when he
assaulted Jen because Jen was holding Matti while Blaz beat her head
against the floor.100 Blaz knew that Matti, like her mother, was also unsafe
during the PFMA assault. 101 The State then applies Blaz’s motive to
disregard Matti’s safety to his killing of Matti on August 16, 2013.102
The State also argues that the PFMA no contact order evidence
provided a motive for why Blaz neglected to take Matti to the hospital
sooner.103 As part of his PFMA suspended sentence, the city court ordered
that Blaz have no contact with Jen.104 Blaz knew that if he took Matti to
the hospital, the hospital would have revealed to the city that he was
violating his no contact order with Jen and provided grounds to revoke his
prior sentence.105 While a defendant may delay seeking medical attention
for his or her victim to avoid punishment for a present offense, a motive
also exists to delay medical attention for the victim because seeking
medical attention might result in the revocation of his prior suspended
sentence.106
2. The District Court’s Admission of the PFMA Evidence did not violate
Rule 403.
Next, the State argues that the probative value of the PFMA
evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of any unfair
97

Id. at *39.
Id.
99
Brief of Appellee, supra note 3, at *25.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id. at *26.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.
98
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prejudice and that Blaz has not shown that the PFMA evidence was overly
prejudicial to him.107 The State provides two bases for this contention: (1)
the jury was instructed by both the prosecutor and the District Court to not
use the PFMA evidence to consider him a bad character, and this
instruction properly cured any unfair prejudice stemming from the PFMA
evidence; and (2) the PFMA evidence was probative because it supported
Blaz’s motive 108 and strengthened the inference that Blaz had killed
Matti. 109 In addition, the State argues that the PFMA evidence was
probative because it rebuts Blaz’s suggestion that Brooks caused Matti’s
injuries by accidentally dropping her.110
3.
Even if the District Court did err in admitting the PFMA evidence,
the error was harmless.
Finally, the State contends that the admission of the PFMA
evidence was harmless because of the medical evidence showing that
Matti was not injured as a result of Brooks dropping her, because of Blaz’s
inconsistent and incredible testimony regarding the offense, because of the
District Court’s cautionary instruction, and because the State admonished
the jury in closing argument to not improperly use the PFMA evidence.111
Thus, even if the jury did not hear evidence regarding the PFMA, the
verdict would still have been returned as guilty.
First, the State argues that the medical evidence and testimony
contradicts Blaz’s story that Brooks accidentally dropped Matti. 112 Dr.
Lewis and Dr. Kemp both opined that Matti’s injuries could not have been
sustained from being dropped on the floor.113 They both testified that the
severity of Matti’s injuries could only be the result of a person
intentionally banging Matti’s head against a flat, broad object to commit a
homicide.114 The medical evidence also contradicts Blaz’s statements that
he was unaware of the severity of Matti’s injuries until they went to
Murdoch’s at 3:30.115 Dr. Kemp testified that Matti would not have been
acting like a normal baby after suffering a nine centimeter skull fracture,
cerebral laceration, subdural and subarachnoid brain hemorrhaging,
hemorrhaging in the spinal cord and extensive retinal hemorrhaging in
both eyes. 116 This evidence, coupled with the fact that Jen knew that
something was wrong with Matti immediately upon looking at her, makes
107

Id. at *28–29.
See above, where the motive to disregard Matti’s safety and prevent the revocation of his
suspended sentence is discussed.
109
Brief of Appellee, supra note 3, at *29.
110
Id.
111
Id. at *37.
112
Id. at 30.
113
Id. at 30–32.
114
Id. at 31.
115
Id. at 35–37.
116
Id.
108
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Blaz’s claim that he “believed Matti was fine and did not know the extent
of her injuries until around 3:00 pm,” unbelievable.117 Additionally, Dr.
Kemp’s autopsy calls into question Blaz’s claim that he gave Matti a bottle
of milk when the autopsy revealed a thick, greenish black substance in
Matti’s stomach.118 Dr. Kemp testified that milk in an infant’s stomach
looks white and sticky, not greenish black, and that he therefore “would
be suspicious” if he was told that the deceased had consumed milk prior
to their death.119
Second, the State contends that Blaz’s inconsistent statements
about the events surrounding Matti’s death, taken in context with other
witness testimony refuting his statements, demonstrates that Blaz is not
credible and that his story placing the blame on Brooks for accidentally
dropping Matti is not believable.120 Blaz gave conflicting statements in his
interviews with Officer St. Pierre, Officer McCarthy and Officer Holland,
and he gave conflicting statements to Jen, Dr. Kemp, and at trial.121 Blaz
contradicts himself with statements relating to when the incident occurred,
when he had lunch with Jen, when he laid Matti down for a nap, whether
he fed Matti a bottle of milk, whether he actually saw Brooks holding
Matti, and whether or not he gave Matti a bath.122 Blaz’s statements also
conflict with other witness testimony regarding whether he gave Matti a
bottle of milk; whether Brooks was holding Matti; whether the mailman
said, “get your ass in there” after Matti screamed; whether Matti actually
screamed; and when the incident occurred.123
V.

ANALYSIS

The Court will likely focus most of its attention on Rule 404(b).
While Rule 403 is inherent in the balancing of evidence for Rule 404(b)
issues, it is not the sole focus of this case and will probably not determine
the outcome of whether the District Court properly admitted the PFMA
evidence. If the Court finds that the District Court erred in admitting the
evidence, the Court’s focus will turn to whether or not the admission was
a harmless error; that is, whether the jury would have still returned a guilty
verdict if they did not hear the PFMA evidence.
The Court’s ruling on whether the evidence was properly admitted
under Rule 404(b) will solidify a boundary for future 404(b) cases. If the
Court holds that the evidence was properly admitted, it will broaden the
scope of 404(b) and allow admittance of evidence that walks the line of
admissibility. However, if the Court holds that the evidence should not
117

Id. at 36–37.
Id. at 34–35.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 32–36.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id.
118
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have been admitted at the District Court, the Court is narrowing the scope
of 404(b) in Montana to only allow evidence that shows a direct alternative
purpose regarding motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.124
Despite the PFMA evidence having extreme probative value, the
policy behind discouraging its admission lies in the practical experience
that its disallowance prevents serious risk of confusion of issues, unfair
surprise and unfair prejudice. 125 Allowing the jury to hear that Blaz
committed an offense where he assaulted his victim in the exact same way
that he allegedly killed this victim is extremely prejudicial. Specifically, it
creates the impermissible inference that Blaz is more likely to commit the
current crime because he committed one in the past. This adds unnecessary
and irreparable weight to the likelihood that the defendant committed the
crime without providing the necessary evidence to support his guilt. A
conviction based on evidence that does not connect the defendant’s actions
surrounding the events of the crime to the crime itself is susceptible to a
new trial on the basis that the defendant did not receive a fair trial.
Blaz relies heavily on the fact that the PFMA was not admitted
to show motive or mistake and that its admittance was overly prejudicial
per Rule 403. Blaz hinges this argument on the failure of the jury
instructions to eliminate the unfair prejudice, which the State claims to
have properly limited by instructing the jury to only use the evidence to
determine motive and absence of mistake, not for character purposes.
However, a jury instruction does not always cure unfair prejudice.126 If it
did, then there would be no need for a Rule 403 balancing test.127
The PFMA evidence that the State seeks to admit is precisely
what Rule 404(b) seeks to avoid. The evidence is of a prior act that
supports an inference that Blaz killed his daughter in the same way that he
assaulted his wife, and the State has struggled with finding another
purpose to admit the evidence under Rule 404(b)(2). The State will likely
not be able to show that it supports a lack of mistake because that is only
available when the defense claims that they did commit the crime but
claim it was an accident.128 Blaz’s defense is that Brooks killed Matti, not
that he killed Matti as an accident. After understanding that Blaz does not
claim to have accidentally killed Matti, the Court will likely dismiss the
State’s contention that the PFMA evidence should be admitted to show a
lack of mistake.
The State’s motive argument seems to be its strongest. However,
the Court will need to dig deeper with regards to whether the PFMA
124

MONT. R. EVID. 404(b).
Fed. Rules of Evid. R. 404(b) (2016), Advisory Committee’s Note (2006 Amendment).
126
Reply Brief of Appellant, State v. Blaz, 2017 WL 589743 at *12 (Mont. Jan. 30, 2017) (No. DA
14-0807) (citing State v. Dist. Ct. of Eighteenth Jud. Dist., Hon. Michael Salvagni, Presiding, 2010
MT 263, ¶49.).
127
Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 129, at *12.
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See Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at *29–30.
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evidence should be admitted to show that Blaz had a motive to disregard
Matti’s safety. While Blaz did disregard Matti’s safety when he assaulted
Jen and while he allegedly killed Matti, to say that this disregard was the
direct motive for assaulting Jen asks the jury to infer that Blaz’s anger
towards Jen in the assault is akin to his disregard of Matti’s safety. The
primary reason that Blaz assaulted Jen was because Blaz wanted to hold
Matti, and Jen took Matti away.129 Blaz then became angry with Jen, which
led him to throw her to the ground and bang her head against the floor.130
Blaz’s anger towards Jen fueled his motive to hurt her. Put differently,
Blaz was motivated by his anger towards Jen, not by his disregard for
Matti’s safety. Although this disregard was an incidental byproduct of his
anger towards Jen, it was not the primary motivation for the assault.
The Court would then need to apply this already distantly
connected motive to the killing of Matti. Even if the Court decided that
Blaz’s assault against Jen was primarily motivated by his disregard for
Matti’s safety, it would also have to agree with the State that a direct
homicide is the result of merely disregarding someone’s safety. A
deliberate homicide requires a direct action, a purposeful and knowing
cause of another person’s death.131 To disregard, by contrast, requires one
to “pay no attention to, or treat as unworthy of regard or notice.”132 The
Court would need to somehow be persuaded that Blaz’s deliberate action
of banging Matti’s head against the floor, per the State’s theory, was due
to a mere “disregard” of Matti’s safety.
In the likely event that the Court will determine that there is not
a sound enough basis to admit the PFMA evidence under Rule 404(b), the
State has a strong case for persuading the Court that the error was a
harmless error. Specifically, the medical evidence presented by the State
shows that the killing was a result of a deliberate homicide due to the
severity of Matti’s injuries. 133 The medical evidence refutes any
suggestion that Matti’s injuries were sustained because Brooks dropped
Matti on the floor134 and therefore makes Blaz’s defense not believable.
Additionally, the State effectively attacks Blaz’s credibility by
demonstrating that his testimony was inconsistent, comparing it to Blaz’s
prior statements and to the statement’s made by numerous other
witnesses.135

129

Brief of Appellee, supra note 3, at 21–22.
Id.
131
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–5–102 (2015).
132
MARRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (last visited April 14, 2017), https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/disregard.
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See Brief of Appellee, supra note 3, at *30–37.
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Brief of Appellee, supra note 3, at 19–20.
135
See Brief of Appellee, supra note 3, at *30–37.
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